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SIEBERT WOLFE, 1996 ; DONGES ET AL., 1997; LÜBCKE, PIAZOLO, 1998; HINDLEY, 1999; SCHOTT, OEGG, 2001 , SIEBERT 2002 . This article resumes the traditional debate on the effects of such an area and departs from recent policy initiatives in transatlantic relations during the nineties (Section 1). These initiatives have been accompanied by important changes in EU and US policies towards bilateral and regional trade relations. These changes will be introduced in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the potential benefits which may arise from TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Area) while Section 4 addresses its costs both internally as well as externally for third parties. Section 5 stylizes alternatives to a rigid institutionalized FTA (Free Trade Area) without forgoing its benefits. Section 6 concludes on the results.
Transatlantic Economic Cooperation since the Madrid Summit
As a result of the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration, EU-US economic summits were introduced to give bilateral relations a new momentum. Each of these summits addressed a special aspect of cooperation. At the EU-US summit of December 1995 in Madrid, the EU and the US formally approved the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and a Joint EU-US Action Plan for implementation. Apart from economic and trade issues, the NTA included a wide range of commitments to cooperate in areas such as foreign and security policy, international crime, drug trafficking preventions, migration, environment and health. With the NTA, the EU and the US tried to establish an institutionalized forum for transatlantic cooperation and to increase the scope for joint action without moving toward institutionalized regional integration.
At the EU-US Summit of May 1997 in the Hague, the Agreement on Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters was signed and in December 1997 the Science and Technology Agreement was endorsed, which extends and strengthens the conduct of co-operative activities between EU scientific institutions and a range of US government research agencies.
One year later in May 1998 in London, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was created, which seeks to improve the economic relationship between the EU and the US as well as to create an open and more accessible world trading system. In the same year, the To sum up, the US and EU have not only converged in terms of the general thrust of their trade policies, both now "going" more regional. They have also used trade policies to penetrate in each others economic backyard, the EU in Latin America and the US in the 
Stylised effects of TAFTA
Minimising discrimination against third countries at a given level of efficiency gains from forming a FTA is a yardstick which regional arrangements have to satisfy when compared to multilateral arrangements. The Vinerian customs union theory has provided the workhorse to specify the criteria when referring to trade creation as welfare enhancing effects of integration deepening and trade diversion as welfare decreasing effects of discrimination against third countries.
Trade creation exceeding trade diversion?
As a rule of thumb, the welfare-enhancing effect of efficiency gains inside the union (often referred to as a result of trade creation) is expected to exceed welfare-decreasing discrimination outside the union (referred to as trade diversion)
• the larger the initial share of the member countries in world trade
• and the larger the initial share of intra-regional trade in the total trade of the member countries.
These two criteria can be applied to TAFTA.
The EU and the US are the leading individual players of world trade closely followed by Japan. However, this ranking does not indicate an overwhelmingly dominant position in world trade. In 1999, the two actors accounted for 34 per cent of world total exports (including commodities) and 39 per cent of world manufactured exports (Table 1) . Hence, more than 60 per cent of world trade (excluding intra-EU trade) cannot be attributed to them but to trading partners basically in Asia and other countries of the Western hemisphere. Whether TAFTA meets the first criterion is particularly questionable due to the observation that the trend since 1980 has been either stagnating (total trade) or declining (manufactures). This is most visible in manufactured exports where trade policies are especially relevant because of higher trade barriers than for commodities.
While the share of the US in world manufactured exports remained more or less constant, that of the EU declined visibly due to both slower economic growth and inward orientation. With more dynamic trading partners outside TAFTA than inside, the risk of sizable discrimination effects cannot be ignored.
As concerns the second criterion, the magnitude of intra-area trade, similar conclusions can be drawn as to the first one (Table 2 ). Both the US and the EU largely trade with other countries and again the overall trend in intra-"TAFTA"-trade has been declining, especially in manufactures, with the exception of the importance of the US market for EU manufactures.
Merging the two criteria yields that in 1999 only about 9 per cent of world manufactured exports was due to US exports to the EU and EU exports to the US (after 8 per cent in 1980). While this may signal a still untapped potential for trade expansion between the two areas, it mainly suggests that trade diversion effects of bilateral trade liberalization to the disadvantage of more dynamic trading partners outside TAFTA can be substantial.
Quid pro quo investment as a shelter against a fortress TAFTA?
Unlike in trade, EU-US foreign direct investment flows are substantial in both directions. In terms of FDI outward flows, the US has become even more attractive during the Overall, the outstanding characteristic of the EU-US economic relations is the mutual inter-linkage through FDI. 4 Companies from both regions have considerable assets in the other region's market and are therefore strongly inclined to maintain well functioning transatlantic trade links in the absence of TAFTA. In this respect, foreign risk capital can act as quid pro quo investment, i.e. to diffuse protectionist threats by taking influence on the formulation of trade policies in the host country (BHAGWATI, DINOPOULOS, WONG, 1992) . It seems largely due to the intensity of bilateral investment ties that serious trade policy conflicts in the past could always be finally settled without escalating into a trade war.
The central role of transatlantic FDI can be substantiated at the firm level, too, by consulting the DOME Database On Mergers in Europe. DOME consists of all merger cases between 1990 and the end of 1999 that were examined by the European Commission and therefore provides a good base to examine transatlantic activites in more detail (DOME, 2002; HAMMERMANN, KLEINERT, 2001) . the US gained considerable importance. Consequently, increasing transatlantic activities of companies lead to further economic and institutional interdependencies of the countrieseven without the fixed setting of a TAFTA.
Does imperfect competition wipe out concerns about TAFTA?
The EU and the US share similarities in their income stage, levels of technology, and in the availability of capital and skilled labour. In a gravity model context, these similarities stand for "mass" and facilitate bilateral trade flows, in contrast to "distance" as the tradeimpeding factor. Yet, it is less the volume that matters here but the composition of trade.
Similarities in factor endowment and high income levels suggest intra-industry trade based on imperfect competition to be dominant rather than inter-industry trade. Intra-industry trade is based on economies of scale as well as variety of preferences on the demand side and allows countries to benefit from larger markets and to consume a greater variety of goods. Under such conditions, the traditional trade creation and trade diversion debate based on perfect competition loses some of its relevance. What could make a high share of intra-industry trade an asset in this context is that it is much less vulnerable to protectionism than inter-industry trade. Political opposition against liberalisation is diffused if freeing trade leads to expansion of both exports and imports in the same sector.
Opposition against trade concessions on the import side can be contained if liberalisation promises to stimulate own exports from this sector, too. Both quid pro quo investment and intra-industry trade can stimulate the formation of a TAFTA but they can also protect transatlantic economic relations against a possible failure of an institutionalized free trade area. Liberalization is furthermore facilitated if the degree of openness between the members of a free trade arrangement is similar. Such openness can be approximated by the contribution of external imports to total domestic supply (apparent consumption). In the US and EU, this contribution was fairly similar during the eighties and early nineties (SIEBERT ET AL., 1996: 60).
Are fears about discrimination effects against third countries overrated?
The concept of "New Regionalism" (ETHIER, 1998) defends its positive assessment toward regional or bilateral trade agreements by pointing to the endogeneity of regionalism: It is derived from successful multilateral liberalization since a multilateral dismantling of border barriers is expected to favour trade with closer partners relative to trade with more remote partners anyway. In this realm, trade diversion effects would not play a major role since trade barriers vis-à-vis third countries had already been cut multilaterally thus leaving preference margins of intra-area trade at a low level. Even if one takes into consideration that neither non-tariff barriers nor dynamic effects are taken into account, it is suggestive to argue that intra-TAFTA tariff liberalization confined to merchandise trade is unlikely to have a strong effect on changes in national income of the two trading partners. Nor can large trade diverting effects be expected to emerge from tariff dismantling only. Yet, this analysis neglects potential investment-creating effects of TAFTA as well as its incentives for product innovation derived from the strong intraindustry component in bilateral trade.
The Costs of TAFTA
The preceding section has presented some arguments against the view that founding TAFTA as a traditional free trade area would be a sea change compared to the pre-TAFTA period. Nevertheless, costs both for the partners as well as for the rest of the world should not be ignored. In fact, TAFTA would have a number of important internal and external consequences.
The Domestic Dimension of TAFTA
The basic domestic dimension of TAFTA consists of submitting all sectors and industries to the GATT discipline demanded in GATT Art. XXIV. This article requires to include "substantially all trade" in intra-FTA trade liberalization. It is known that neither in the GATT period nor during the early years of the WTO, this discipline could be enforced.
Most FTAs regardless of whether they can be labeled "old " or "new" still exclude Within TAFTA, agriculture which is protected in both partner areas but considerably more in the EU would be a showcase as can be witnessed by a number of empirical estimates. In his "1994 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers", the US Trade
Representative claims that the elimination of the entire EU agricultural support system including variable levies, price supports and export subsidies would increase US exports to all EU markets between $4 billion and $5 billion while decreasing US imports about $2 billion (USTR, 1994: 73) .
How far-reaching the liberalization of agricultural policies in the EU would be in terms of world welfare gains, is suggested by general equilibrium models. They yield that about half of all welfare gains arising from worldwide liberalization of the agricultural sector can be attributed to EU reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and that more than half of the entire effects of EU trade liberalization accrue to the reforms in the EU agricultural sector (HARRISON, RUTHERFORD, TARR, 1996) . Corresponding effects of liberalizing the US agricultural sector are much lower. Recent studies by the OECD Secretariat suggest declining levels of producer support and protection in the EU and the US relative to the benchmark years 1986 -1988 (OECD 2001 . Yet, it is also noted that this has primarily been due to international price and exchange rate movements rather than agricultural policy changes.
The unbroken political attitude toward subsidization of the agricultural sector, the rising importance of so-called non-trade concerns in agriculture like food security, health, environmental protection, social stability in rural areas and animal protection as new cases for subsidization, and, finally, the still unsettled fundamentally different views in the EU and the USA on the use of biotechnological innovations in agricultural production are powerful barriers against liberalizing transatlantic trade in agriculture. It is therefore very unlikely that both partners would agree to treat agriculture in TAFTA in the same way as manufactures and to submit it to the "substantially-all-trade" criterion. What has failed in WTO dispute settlement procedures between the EU and the US, cannot be easily solved within TAFTA.
The agricultural sector is the most important stumbling bloc in a TAFTA which would meet the "substantially-all-trade" criterion. Yet, it is not the only on. Other sensitive sectors which have been partly subject to bilateral disputes in the GATT/WTO in the past comprise steel, textiles, services, aviation, the defence industry and e-commerce. • The regime for the importation, sale, and distribution of bananas.
• The regime for the importation of meat products from hormone treated cattle.
• The market access for pharmaceuticals.
• The approval process for genetically modified products.
• Intellectual property protection.
• Measures affecting the grant of copyrights.
• The protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs.
• The requirements for hush kitted and recertified aircrafts.
• Government procurement that discriminates against non-EU bids.
• Export subsidies and government support for Airbus and Airbus suppliers.
• The government support for shipbuilding industry.
• The EU television broadcast requirement favoring European origin programs.
On the other side, the EU COMMISSION (2002) complains about a number of US trade impediments, like:
• Excessive registration, documentation and invoice requirements for importers by the US customs authorities.
• Establishment of excessive user fees for formerly free service on the arrival of merchandise, vessels etc.
• "Buy-American" requirements of government procurement.
• Import restrictions or requirements concerning tuna-fishing, shrimps and dairy products.
• Government support for aircraft production and shipbuilding.
• Export subsidies for agricultural and fisheries product.
• Entry barriers to the US banking market.
• Tax codes that discriminate against foreign companies.
The External Dimension of TAFTA
The overall economic effects of transatlantic liberalization can be examined by applying computable general equilibrium models. This has been done by FRANCOIS (1996 and The insights of these simulation exercises underline the superiority of a multilateral approach: If economic gains are the target of liberalization initiatives of the transatlantic partners, the approach should be multilateral, not bilateral.
Discrimination of third countries
The discrimination issue is of critical importance when assessing the compliance of TAFTA with the WTO requirements. As discussed above, preferential tariff margins matter less since they are going to be eroded with ongoing multilateral tariff dismantling.
Instead, for non-TAFTA countries, the non-application of MFN principles regarding the compliance with TAFTA rules, norms and regulations deserves more attention. TAFTA would probably set common rules for many trade-related policy areas, including the rights of establishment of companies, capital mobility, environmental standards, and perhaps even for competition policies and investment codes. Given TAFTA's economic weight and scale economies of rules, TAFTA rules would become globally dominant and binding 6 .
How such rules would be developed, either by ex ante harmonization or by mutual recognition (ex post harmonization), would be essential for third countries. The latter procedure would give them options to either comply with the EU or the US rules as each of them would give them access to the entire TAFTA market. The former procedure, however, could deteriorate conditions of access to one the two individual markets if the common standard would either be identical with the former US or EU standard or, more realistically, an average of the two. Net changes in access conditions would be ambiguous depending on changes in conditions of access to the other market. Again, the EU Single Market completion provides showcases for this problem. In principle, the EU Treaty offers both options but in practice has given priority to ex ante harmonization. As a result, regulations concerning the environment, for instance, became very much stricter in lower-income member states relative to pre-1992 and made access to these markets more costly for non-member states.
In collective bargaining, non-TAFTA countries could therefore understand TAFTA as a signal that the world's richest countries are more concerned in jointly discriminating against the rest of the world than in opening their markets to countries with less demanding regulations and standards. There is the danger that TAFTA would be seen as a only slightly modified form of the rich man's club which for a long time was a label for the GATT.
Free trade arrangements with third countries
The EU operates a most complex and extensive system of preferential trading agreement with other countries. It spans the entire spectrum of preferential trade agreements from free trade ares via customs unions, non-reciprocal agreements to unilateral trade concessions for developing countries (Generalised System of Preferences). The year 2000 Trade Policy Review Report of the WTO on the EU notes that exclusively MFN treatment applies only to imports from eight WTO members (WTO 2000: 29) . One of them is the US so that the group of WTO members subject to MFN treatment would shrink further. Similarly, the US has free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico apart from "hub-and-spoke" agreements with few other countries.
Under these conditions, TAFTA would have to handle not only the policy framework for direct current account transactions but take into account incentives for indirect "circumvention" trade which is also called trade deflection. Trade deflection occurs if external tariffs of FTA partners differ from each other to the extent that imports into the FTA country with the lowest external tariff before shipment to the destination country with a higher external tariff are profitable. For instance, TAFTA would have to fix conditions for Canadian exports to the EU which as a direct trade flow would not be eligible for dutyfree treatment but could indirectly benefit from TAFTA via exports to the US under the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement before being shipped to the EU. To discourage trade deflection, TAFTA needs a complex rule of origin procedure to guarantee that intra-TAFTA trade is treated more favourable than trade between a TAFTA member country with its hub-and spoke partner country. With increasing globalisation of production and markets, this could fuel trade policy disputes and lead to high transaction costs in order to separate beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries. In contrast to a customs union with a common external tariff, rules of origin in a free trade area are much more susceptible to abuse for protectionist purposes (KRUEGER, 1995) .
Consequences for the multilateral trading process
Consequences for the multilateral trading process depend very much on the choice of the bilateral arrangement between the US and its spokes on the one hand and the EU and its spokes on the other hand. Either a Transatlantic Customs Union TACU or the automatic extension of all rights from bilateral agreements between one TAFTA member countries and third parties to TAFTA in total (the TAFTA-South approach) could be instrumental to prevent a further policy-induced segmentation of markets. TACU would be more consistent with GATT Art. XXIV but would require a uniform level of protection against third countries in such highly disputed sectors like services and agriculture. Ideally, such level should approximate the lower one of the two national levels in order to comply with the prescription that third parties' rights under the WTO should not be nullified or impaired due to the formation of a customs union (BHAGWATI, 1991: 77) .
Nevertheless, the formation of TAFTA would constitute the strongest building bloc towards regionalism and thus the most serious challenge to the multilateral approach of trade liberalisation. Given the economic leverage of the two partners, third countries would have to accept the outcome of bilateral intra-TAFTA negotiations as binding for the rest of the world. Negotations under the WTO framework would become widely obsolete.
Furthermore, given historical experiences of successful lobbying in both areas for special sectoral privileges, it is very likely that TAFTA would not cover all sectors. Hence, both sectoral incompleteness and regional limitation would bend WTO rules and undermine the multilateral process. 
The Unconventional Way: Liberalization à la Carte
When the authors addressed the issue of TAFTA for the first time (SIEBERT they were fairly optimistic that a US-EU specific transatlantic liberalization initiative TALI could be based on the objective to act as a spear-head for the implementation for the Uruguay Round. Six years of experience with the implementation record, however, do not give rise to optimism. The two parties refused to accept this role and instead became victims of a quagmire of delays, disputes and mutual dissatisfaction. More modesty seems at stake. Such a minimum approach could comprise initiatives to so-called trade facilitation which includes, for instance, the streamlining of customs declaration procedures or the facilitation of preinspection procedures. Bilateral working groups could work out common proposals and open them to third parties within the multilateral trading order. The two parties could also set the pace for new issues which came up only after the Uruguay Round such as rules for trading in electronic media, a WTO-consistent application of the so-called precautionary principle as well as the identification of hitherto nontransparent trading costs. To concentrate aspects of trade facilitation on new issues instead of the old ones, carries an important advantage. The new issues are not yet blocked by vested interests, hence, they give the two parties a chance to act as forerunners.
The Controversial Way: Moving Towards Open Regionalism
For the time being, it seems unrealistic, to expect a breakthrough in the so-called open regionalism of APEC which basically is a regionally concerted approach to conditional MFN. Heterogeneity and diverging interests are seemingly too large to be reconcilable even within a wide framework and a long time horizon until the year 2020. Instead, the concept of open regionalism seems to be more promising in the transatlantic arena where the principle of conditional MFN treatment can be more easily extended to the trading partners of the US and EU especially if these partners are already linked to one of the two areas through bilateral agreements. The underlying idea is to commit the countries to the principle of MFN treatment and to induce them by facilitating the access to the two transatlantic markets. As an example, the free trade agreement of the Americas would be more acceptable and appealing to Latin American countries if any concessions negotiated between the North and the Latin American countries would be offered to the EU provided that the EU would follow suit by opening its market. In doing so, EU-US trade cooperation could still be called a regional initiative like TALI but would loose its negative momentum as a "lock-out mechanism" against third countries.
Conclusions
By the beginning of the new century, both the US and the EU seem to pay lip services to the multilateral system while intensifying their bilateral negotiations with third countries. This approach is highly vulnerable to raising transaction costs for countries which are excluded from these negotiations. The idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area is open to similar concerns. In this paper, we have shown that the disadvantages of TAFTA to the multilateral system are substantial and that much more flexible and open approaches to transatlantic trade liberalization promise better results both for the partners as well as the rest of the world. Regrettably, however, neither the EU nor the US seem prepared to act jointly as pace setters for the liberalization of either old or new issues. In this respect, the old regionalism still seems to be unbeaten. TAFTA with its inherent lock-out characteristics would be a further step towards closed regionalism. Instead, there is more to be gained in terms of world welfare if the approach of conditional MFN treatment which seem to have failed in the Asia-Pacific Rim because of excessive heterogeneity would be taken more seriously in the North Atlantic Rim. This approval would place the US and the EU jointly in the driver seat of a multilateral liberalization convoi.
